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1. Assignment of a Russian ILO Expert to Indonesia
2. Arrangements for his Visit to the U. S.
3. Tokyo Demonstrations Against U. S. Treaty and
President Eisenhower note
4. Desirability of a U. S. Presidential Visit to Indonesia
5. The "U-2" Incident and the Summit Conference
6. Communists in the Indonesian Labor Movement

Enclosed is a memorandum of conversation on the above subjects between Labor Minister Ahmed Erningradja, the Labor Attaché and Second Secretary George P. Kalaris on June 16, 1960.

On this occasion, Minister Ahom appeared sincerely apologetic and personally disappointed that the President had directed him to visit the USSR as well as the United States this year. He several months earlier had reported himself resigned to accompanying Prime Minister DJUANDA on the latter's visit to Moscow slated to begin June 26. Recently, before the President's return, he had reported happily that Djuanda had released him from this assignment, and he had looked forward with apparent eagerness to visiting the United States beginning the end of June, lacking only the President's approval.

Ahom's interest in the platforms of Presidential candidates Vice-President Nixon and Senator Kennedy, and his awareness of our revelation in the U.N. of the United States Moscow Embassy Great Seal "bugging" development are indications that the Minister has been doing a good deal of reading in preparation for his trip and that his interest in establishing the sincerity of our international policies is quite keen.

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.:

Robert L. Kinney
Labor Attaché

Chloroquine:

Memorandum of Conversation

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gakkaris/RLKinney:jf

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From Djakarta

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION:

Participants: Minister of Labor, Ahem Erninandradja; Robert L. Kinney, Labor Attaché; George F. Kalaris, Embassy Labor Reporting Officer

Date and Place: Minister's Office, June 16, 1960 from 9:00 to 10:00

In response to an invitation from the Minister the two aforementioned Embassy officers visited the Minister at his office. The following topics were discussed:

a. The assignment of the Russian ILO Manpower Specialist: The Minister disclosed that he had had a conversation with the Local UNTAB representative Osario-Tafail concerning the assignment to Indonesia of a Russian ILO expert on manpower problems. The Minister stated to Tafail that he would like to have the appointment cancelled, but did not know if this was possible under the circumstances, the most important of which was the fact that he had already signed the request for the assignment of the Russian. Furthermore, he felt that an outright cancellation at this point would undoubtedly cause him a number of problems. It was agreed therefore between the Minister and Osario-Tafail that the latter would advise the ILO that the Minister wished to postpone for an indefinite period the arrival here of the Russian on the grounds 1) that the manpower section of the Ministry was being re-organized and 2) that the Minister was reluctant to accept the arrangements re the translator who would be provided by the local USSR Embassy. (Interrupting temporarily his account of his conversation with Osario-Tafail, the Minister said that he did not want a spy from the Russian Embassy sitting right in the Ministry which would be the case if he agreed to the assignment of an interpreter by the Russian government.) The Minister concluded his account of the discussion with Osario-Tafail by saying that he did not know whether or not he could finally prevent the Russian from coming, but that he was going to try to keep postponing the arrival.

b. On his trip to the United States: Minister said that he had discussed the question with the President who wholeheartedly approved of the idea stating that he (the president) felt that the Minister's trip would be very "constructive". The President, however, pointed out to him that if he were to accept only an invitation from the U. S. his position would become vulnerable, because undoubtedly the SOBSI would attempt to make an issue of this. The President therefore advocated that he combine his trip to the U. S. with a visit to Moscow. The Minister was very apologetic over this, stating that he had no desire to visit Moscow; that he felt uneasy about going to a land where fear was evident on the faces of the people; to a country where you did not dare have a confidential conversation in your own hotel room because you knew that the room was bugged; but he felt that he had to comply with the President's instruction.

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He reiterated a number of times that he was very sorry about this development and hoped that it would not cause us any inconvenience. He indicated that he expected to stay in the USSR for about two weeks, but that he would like to visit the U. S. for a period of approximately 4 weeks. On his way to the U. S., the Minister would like to stop off in Geneva for a couple of days to see ILO Director-General Lorse and staff and thank them for the assistance they are providing to Indonesia. He would hope that his U. S. trip could start from Geneva.

On his trip to Moscow, the Minister expects to be accompanied by a secretary-assistant. He also expects that a similar arrangement will be made for his trip to the U. S. For the Geneva and U. S. portion of his trip, he would like to be accompanied by Mr. Godjali, as his private secretary. (Godjali has already been nominated as a candidate for a leadership grant in 1961)

c. On the Tokyo Demonstrations: Minister of People's Industries Suharto told Anem that it was his observation based on his stay in Tokyo during the last ten days of May with the Sukarno party that 90 per cent of the Japanese were non-demonstrative about the visit of President Eisenhower and that the only element stirring up the commotion was a small ten per cent under the influence of the communists and left-wing socialists.

d. On a Future U.S. Presidential Visit to Indonesia: Minister stated that a visit by a U. S. President to Indonesia would be extremely valuable. He guaranteed that there would be no problems and that the reception would be as great if not greater than that given Khrushchev. He seemed anxious to impress upon us that such a visit would be very welcome and would have beneficial effects. He said that it would cause "the other side" (PKI) trouble. He recognized the fact that President Eisenhower could probably no longer come, but expressed the hope that the new President would in 1961. He said that there need be no concern whatsoever about security during such a visit. He also indicated that he was following with interest the Presidential campaign in the U. S. and stated that he had read the international affairs platforms of Nixon and Kennedy and had found them to resemble each other.

e. On the "U-2" Incident and the Summit Meet: The Minister expressed no shock about the incident stating that obviously the flight had been going on for a number of years; he was chagrined only by the fact that the capture shortly before the Summit meeting had given the USSR an excuse (causus belli) for breaking up the meeting. He concluded, however, by agreeing that had it not been for the U-2 the Russians would undoubtedly have found some other excuse; it probably, however, would not have been as sensational. He regretted the fact that we have been so reluctant over the years to publicize the instances of Soviet espionage against the free world. He was quite familiar with the Great Seal incident of our Embassy in Moscow.

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f. On the Communists in the Labor Movement: Minister admitted that non-communist labor groups in Indonesia were far too political for their own good and that communists knew how to appeal to the workers through programs designed to impress the workers that they (the communists) were interested in their welfare. He expressed the hope that the ICA sponsored Trade Union Education Program would help in changing this situation by training non-communist labor officials in the role expected of them by the workers.

gjk *dk* *P. gal*
GTKalaris/LKinney:jf

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 12985
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Info FROM: DJAKARTA

SS TO: Secretary of State
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EUR NO: 3194, MAY 19, 4 PM

USIA SCA INR CIA NSA AGR COM FRB INT TRSY
EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT GOI POLICY
TOWARDS ESTATE CONCESSION TITLES:

1. CONCESSIONS ALREADY EXPIRED OR WHICH WILL EXPIRE BEFORE SEPTEMBER 23, 1965, THAT IS, WITHIN FIVE YEARS AFTER PROMULGATION BASIC AGRARIAN LAW, SEPTEMBER 24, 1960, WILL NOT BE RENEWED.

2. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT CONCESSIONS WHICH RECONVERTED TO RIGHTS OF EXPLOITATION FOR 20 YEARS IN ACCORDANCE AGRARIAN LAW MAY BE RENEWED FOR FURTHER PERIOD AT EXPIRATION THAT 20 YEARS BUT SUCH RENEWAL WOULD PROBABLY NOT INCLUDE RIGHT REPATRIATE PROFITS. THESE PROVISIONS NOT YET FIRM.

3. CONCESSIONS WITH MORE THAN 5 YEARS BUT LESS THAN 20 YEARS TO RUN WHICH GO TOGETHER TO MAKE UP AN IDENTIFIABLE ESTATE COMPLEX MAY BE RENEWABLE FOR PERIOD ROUGHLY EQUAL THEIR AVERAGE LIFE.

4. WHEN TAKEN OVER BY GOI COMPENSATION WILL BE PAID FOR YOUNG TREES NOT YET IN PRODUCTION AND ALSO FOR CROPS IN PRODUCTION, WITHIN AS YET UNDEFINED LIMITS.

5. ONLY CONDITION FOR CONVERSION OF CONCESSION TO RIGHT OF EXPLOITATION UNDER AGRARIAN LAW IS THAT COMPANY BE DOMICILED IN INDONESIA.

6. GOI WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH REMITTANCE PROFITS DURING REMAINING PERIOD OF TITLE, BUT GOI WILL EXPECT THAT REPLANTING AND GOOD MAINTENANCE BE CONTINUED TO THE END. CESSATION OF

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FROM Amembassy DJAKARTA

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TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

January 5, 1962

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SUBJECT: Indonesian Foreign Policy Fails to Reflect Domestic Forces Moscow, Tokyo, Madan, The Hague, Surabaya

Over the past few years there has been little doubt of Indonesia's leaning toward the communist Bloc on international issues. During this time Indonesia has often been found on the Soviet side in voting at the United Nations while on such specific contemporary problems such as Berlin and West Germany ~~Indonesia~~ public statements have regularly provided more comfort to Moscow than they have to Washington. Besides its voting record, the Indonesian public posture on most international issues has seemed partial to the communist Bloc. One case in point has been the Government's sadly belated and wishy-washy reaction to the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests. Had the United States been the first to resume testing, official cries of anguish might well have been accompanied by the tinkling of Embassy windows smashed by PKI-led mobs. Similarly, in matters ranging from Cuba to the case of divided nations, the foreign affairs spokesmen of the Indonesian Government have made little secret of their preference for these forces inimical to the United States.

Recently Indonesian leaders, namely Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio, have stressed a view of world politics which is even more antagonistic to the West. According to this view, which resembles a long-standing communist propaganda theme, the fundamental cause of world tension at the present time consists of the clash between new and old forces. The new forces have been characterized as progressive, anti-colonial and socialist, and Indonesian spokesmen have left little doubt that the Bloc nations are included within this grouping of "the good guys." Ranged against these new forces are the "old, established" ones which, in an effort to maintain their fading position of supremacy over the world, practice and support colonialism and neo-imperialism. Though these spokesmen have avoided identifying the United States by name as a constituent part of the old forces, the ordinary listener can hardly escape the impression that a run-down of NATO participants would provide the membership list of this "reactionary clique."

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The Embassy has periodically set forth the factors underlying Indonesian foreign policy. It has reported that one of the most important issues pushing Indonesian policy to the left has been the West New Guinea problem and the respective Bloc and Western positions on this crucial matter. This reminder of the past has helped keep the Indonesians stirred up about colonialism in general. In common with many of the newly independent nations, they see colonialism only in terms of their own experience under the Dutch and thus by definition regard the phenomenon as a Western practice. Their experiences help explain widespread lack of interest in Soviet imperialism. Talk of applying the principle of self-determination to the Bloc satellite nations strikes many Indonesians, who pride themselves on their worldly sophistication, as nothing more than a propaganda catch-word employed by one side in an old fashioned power struggle. At the same time, whether another nation is friend or foe is determined by its public stand toward classical colonialism and this criterion naturally provides a built-in advantage for the Bloc whose rantings on the subject are right down the Indonesian emotional alley. Moscow's success in portraying itself as the champion of world peace during the 1950's also contributed heavily to this state of affairs, and while recent Soviet actions have undoubtedly occasioned second thoughts here, a lingering image of the Russian devotion to peace continues to influence Indonesian foreign policy. These fundamentals alone assure an anti-Western bias for Indonesian neutralism and it is pertinent to note that even under past governments which were basically oriented toward Western democratic ideals (i.e. Cabinets including representatives of the Masjumi and Socialist Parties), Indonesian foreign policy pronouncements were more likely than not to cause dissatisfaction in the West.

However, these issues are only secondary to Sukarno's influence on foreign policy. It is he who speaks for Indonesia, it is he who makes all significant foreign policy decisions. The constellation of Indonesian political forces is such that he simply presides over and manipulates the domestic scene but he rules in the foreign policy field.

In recent years President Sukarno's increasingly active executive role has served to push Indonesia's foreign policies even further toward the left. Aside from the effect such issues as West New Guinea and colonialism have on the foreign policy views of Sukarno, this highly emotional man has proved to be an easy target for intensive Soviet cultivation which has ranged from the provision of unlimited credits to the Indonesians to unstinted public praise for almost every aspect of Indonesian foreign and domestic policy. (For an unsure nation to be told repeatedly that it is pursuing the right course is not a small matter.) In contrast, Sukarno is fully convinced that the United States plotted to bring about his downfall and he suspected until very recently that this remains a cardinal goal of American policy. His suspicions of American intentions are kept alive and reinforced by the adverse press he generally receives in the United States which he is either unable or unwilling to recognize as private opinion. They have lately been offset to some extent by his favorable impression of President Kennedy. The contrasts in Sukarno's mind concerning the treatment afforded his rule by the Soviets and Americans may even result in Sukarno consciously snuggling up to the Bloc as a means of obtaining a powerful outside protector for his position within Indonesia. Publicity attendant upon his

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well-known quest for both personal and national prestige has served to assure that Indonesia's foreign policy bias is painfully apparent to the West.

Sukarno's relative freedom in shaping the nation's foreign policy probably results from the Army's disinclination to become involved in a subject which it neither is familiar with nor feels touches directly on its interests. There is some evidence of heightened concern on the part of the Army leadership concerning the trend of Indonesian foreign policy toward the left but any reaction has probably been hindered by the Army's understandable willingness to go along with arrangements which assure it an alternative source of modern arms over the next few years should the small United States program dwindle, or perhaps be cut off altogether if the West New Guinea issue should end in war. The Army and other forces which tend to restrain Sukarno on the domestic front are probably also aware that their flamboyant President has put Indonesia on the international map and from this they derive varying degrees of nationalistic self-satisfaction. As a result of these factors, Indonesian foreign policy fails somewhat to reflect the domestic forces in the country and to all intents and purposes reflects the will of President Sukarno and a limited number of advisers probably including Foreign Minister Subandrio and Ministers Mohammed Yamin and Ruslan Abdulgani. Some of these advisers are generally considered to be primarily skillful opportunists.

Unless the above factors are taken into consideration in assessing Indonesian foreign policy, a glance at Djakarta's pronouncements over the past two years would suggest to most observers that Indonesia is beyond hope so far as the free world is concerned. However, such a conclusion would ignore the basic fact that the ultimate fate of Indonesia rests on internal developments. Furthermore it would, when added to the displeasing effect of Indonesia's international posture, lead some to overlook the possibility of exerting a favorable influence on what remains a highly fluid and dynamic internal scene.

While Sukarno no doubt has gladdened the hearts of Bloc leaders with many of his decisions and pronouncements in the foreign policy field, domestically the anti-communist forces continue to hold the upper hand despite the advantages provided the Party by the West New Guinea dispute and by the almost unlimited moral and material support forthcoming from the Bloc to Indonesia. By virtue of its superior physical power and virtual control over the ruling processes in the provinces, the Army has with great success kept the lid on the communist movement in Indonesia (the most recent example being the complete failure of communist-inspired strikes and demonstrations in East Java and East Sumatra) and as a result the country stands in no immediate danger of a communist takeover. In addition to the negative element of force opposing the communist movement, other important factors contribute to the strength of anti-communist sentiment in Indonesia. These include the influence of religious beliefs, widespread devotion to the concept of an Indonesian way of running the nation, and the effect on the nation's leadership elite of generations of Western influence which still is profound despite public antagonism toward the Dutch. Aided by some progress toward a solution of the West New Guinea issue, these forces can continue to stand as an effective bar to communism for the time being.

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The Embassy has noted some public discussion of Indonesia in the United States which fails to take into account that for the United States to reduce or remove its influence from such an Indonesian scene as a result of the foreign policy views of a limited number of misguided and politically immature leaders would be a self-administered defeat of major proportions. In this context, it cannot be forgotten that Sukarno's domestic position is sufficiently strong to bring about a serious weakening of our present ties with the Army and other basically favorably disposed forces if he feels impelled to do so by an American rebuff. Abandonment of Indonesia by the United States would leave the Bloc as the sole source of foreign economic and military assistance, with inevitable psychological and political results in both the armed forces and industry. The effect on American commercial interests would undoubtedly be immediate and severe. It would also create a violent anti-American sentiment among most nationalist Indonesians, even those who are dedicated anti-communists. Moreover, American cultural and political influence on the Indonesian intellectual elite would progressively weaken with the intensification of the political estrangement between the two countries. In short, under such conditions the psychological environment created by the contrast in the Bloc and United States approach to Indonesia would be highly favorable to the advancement of the communist cause in Indonesia.

This is not to say that a continued or expanded American influence here necessarily provides assurances that all will go well. Indonesia's presently increasing reliance on the Bloc could in time undermine the country's independence despite U. S. efforts. Of even greater concern is the distinct possibility that the Army and other non-communist forces in the country may prove unequal to the task of launching the constructive programs required to reverse the present economic, social and political deterioration. But it will readily be recognized that the existing assets, and the immense potential of this fifth most highly populated nation of the world, continue to justify the efforts required to deny it to the Bloc. Given a solution to the West New Guinea issue and the continuation of flexible and constructive assistance programs, the unknowns outlined above may prove more manageable than they seem.

For the Ambassador:

*Rolland H. Bushner*Rolland H. Bushner
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs
jh

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TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.				JUN 25 1962 <i>Jm</i> DATE																			
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SUBJECT: Indonesian Official's Estimate of Situation in North Africa and Middle East and Indonesian Policy Toward Countries in that Area																							

Dr. SUDARSONO, Head of the Division of Mahgreb and Middle Eastern Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, provided the reporting officer an estimate of the situation in that area on June 22. Dr. Sudarsono, who was, before a recent Foreign Office reorganization, head of the Division of African and Middle Eastern Affairs, is more than usually well qualified to comment since he has just returned from a trip to Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Amman and Jidda.

According to Dr. Sudarsono, Indonesia's long term hope in the Middle East and North Africa is for greater unity among the Arab peoples. Indonesia, he indicated, sees Nasser as the logical leader to promote this development. Dr. Sudarsono characterized lack of tact as Nasser's greatest weakness in this role.

Dr. Sudarsono said that he had gained a strong impression from talking to people in the area he visited that Nasser has greatly increased his appeal as a leader of the Arab peoples by the recent statement to the "People's Congress" on his objectives in which he stressed that he does not favor dictatorship. In Sudarsono's opinion, this statement was not related to domestic Egyptian politics where Nasser is unchallengeable but was intended for the ears of the Arab people, especially in Syria and Iraq. Dr. Sudarsono claimed he had found leaders in Syria, including those in the Government, desirous of a renewed association with Egypt on the basis of Nasser's "more democratic" policies. He thought the atmosphere in Lebanon was also favorable to Nasser, but within the limits of Lebanese nationalism. On the other hand he left the impression that a voluntary rapprochement between Jordan and Saudi Arabia will not come soon. He considers that the rulers of these two countries have personal grudges against Nasser, and mentioned reports that some of the foreign holdings in Egypt which had been nationalized had belonged to the royal family of Saudi Arabia.

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From American Embassy DJAKARTA

Dr. Sudarsono believes that Lesser has no immediate plan to push for unity with the Sahar states because they need time to develop their own concepts. Dr. Sudarsono considers Algeria to be a natural leader of the Sahar, not only because of the size of its population, but because of the dynamic and revolutionary experience of its leaders. He observed that a union of the Sahar would face real difficulties arising from racial and religious differences and the natural resistance of Tunis and Morocco to any arrangements which would mean a loss of their identities; however, he believes that Algerian leaders will prove tactful in their approach toward this development.

Dr. Sudarsono admitted that he does not foresee much progress toward Arab unity within the next five years, although he left the impression that there may be some steps toward a reunion between Egypt and Syria.

Dr. Sudarsono's views probably represent a combination of his interpretation of government policy and his own estimate of the situation. As a member of the now banned Indonesian Socialist Party (ISI) he has access to top level thinking only through the Foreign Minister, also once a member of the ISI, who it is believed occasionally discusses important matters with Sudarsono. In addition, it is worth noting that Dr. Sudarsono is usually frank in private conversations with American Embassy officials, and the relatively superficial analysis he provided regarding the situation in North Africa and the Middle East probably reflects the general lack of depth of Indonesian official thinking concerning issues in which they have no direct interest.

For the Ambassador,

Holland H. Bushner
Holland H. Bushner
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

Dept. please pass:
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Medan, Surabaya

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TO: *Chairman, Asian Games, Belgrade, Yugoslavia*

ASIAN GAMES, BELGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA

FROM: *Chairman, Asian Games, Belgrade, Yugoslavia*

DATE: *Sept 26, 1964*

SUBJECT: *Asian Games, Belgrade, Yugoslavia*

REF: *None*

In period since termination Asian Games, IOC president, and
secretary general stressed case points its anti-imperialist character and that
this decision excludes Taiwan and Israel, imperceptibly of distinction
this decision, was to expand Asian Games Federation to include
non-socialist Asian countries (Communist China particularly) and
possibility of IOC initiative in formation Afro-Asian (and possibly
possibly Latin American) athletic body. Most recent was call for
capitalize on this subject called forth by actions of Tito meeting
in Belgrade, which Tito wrapped up in connection its anti-imperialist
policy.

Editorial in party journal *Marxist Tribune* Sept 21 (copy attached) rhetorically queries why meeting in Belgrade, capital of socialism, which purports to be in socialist camp, could provide such a "revolutionary decision." Somewhat similarly, editorial in *Pravda* of a "summit conference" of non-aligned countries, also held in Belgrade in 1961, reached decisions less significant than those observed by Tito in his speech at that gathering. Further noted in article that intrigues of imperialists and other revisionist leaders, particularly after Asian games had been frustrated because Asian games were anti people united against imperialism. Tito, therefore, was "colonial intrigues of IAAF" successful in socialist Yugoslavia.

cc: *Chairman, Asian Games, Belgrade, Yugoslavia*
 Enclosure:
 Referred Sept 26 editorial
 Dept pass to info directorate

For the Comité d'Affaires à l'Asie:

Chairman, Asian Games, Belgrade, Yugoslavia
 James P. O'Connor, Jr.
 First Secretary

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Page 1 of 1

Enclosure No. 1 of Airgram No. 322, dated 10/5/62, from DJAKARTA

Editorial from Harian Rakjat, Sept 28

"ONCE AGAIN, BELGRADE"

"Imperialists and reactionaries are making efforts for not recognizing the fourth Asian Games festival. Does it not mean neo-colonialism? Yes, neo-colonialism takes actions in the field of sports too."

"We are not surprised that the USA (Mr. Johnson) and the agents of the USA (Mr. Sondhi and associates) assumed such an attitude which is against the Republic of Indonesia. There is one question which has been left unanswered. It is the following: "How could such reactionary decision be taken in Belgrade, the capital of a country that calls itself to be a socialist country?"

"We remember the summit conference of the non-aligned countries. The speech which was delivered by President Sukarno was so good and the Presidents of Mali, Guinea, etc. delivered fine speeches in that summit conference. But, why were the decisions of that summit conference less than the speech of Bung Karno?

"During the time when the fourth Asian Games festival was being held, before it was held and after it had been held, the intrigues of imperialists and other reactionaries in Indonesia were a failure. They were frustrated because the host, the Indonesian Government and People, were firmly against imperialism. Why could the colonial intrigues of the IAAF be successful in socialist Yugoslavia? Why could their intrigues be frustrated in Indonesia which is not yet a socialist country? We hope that you readers are able to give an answer to these questions. This is not a historical puzzle; it is a historical fact."

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22-704, NUMBER 15. FROM MARXIST

MANIFESTO OF INDO-INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP ROLE
REFERENCE TO "UNIVERSAL VOICE" OF INDO REVOLUTION
AND STATING "WE ARE GOING TO BUILD NEW WORLD NOT
ONLY FOR INDONESIANS BUT FOR ALL MANKIND". LATTER
WOULD BE BASED, ACCORDING INDO-FRS, ON FDR FOUR
FREEDOMS PLUS "FREEDOM TO BE FREE".

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Memorandum of Conversation

696.00/1-1163

SUBJECT: Indonesian Foreign Policy

DATE: January 11, 1963
4:00 p.m.
Secretary's Office

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador
Mr. William Tyler, Assistant Secretary

JAN 18 1963

COPIES TO: S/S *2* Amembassy LONDON
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Amcongen SINGAPORE
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The Ambassador delivered to the Secretary an aide-mémoire consisting of Lord Home's views on Indonesian foreign policy (subsequently handed to S/S). He said the UK had received information which made it clear that Sukarno, instead of confining himself to absorbing West New Guinea, and consolidating the Indonesian economy, was actively scheming against the Federation of Malaysia, and plotting military activities against North Borneo, Portuguese Timor, Australian New Guinea. In the light of this, the UK Government was bothered by US aid to Indonesia. He said the UK idea was that tripartite talks with Australia should be considered. The UK thought it would be desirable to open the eyes of the Philippines to what Sukarno was doing.

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Important that in addition to your underlining to Indonesians
urgent importance their taking adequate stabilization measures if
U.S. is to contribute, you should take opportunity to discuss
frankly with Sukarno and others Indonesian territorial ambitions
particularly Malaysia.

Bearing in mind Sukarno's vanity, his strong nationalism,
and his known admiration for President Kennedy, suggest, in
consultation with Ambassador Jones, appropriate line might be to
refer to statements over the years by leading Indonesians that
the real threat to Indonesia is ultimately the ChiComs and that
in last analysis the Indonesians rely on U.S. military strength
in Pacific to protect them against this threat. We agree that
the real threat to Indonesia and rest of Southeast Asia has been
amply demonstrated in India. As Sukarno knows, we are heavily
engaged in trying to preserve peace of area also in Viet-Nam and
Laos and are fully committed to prevent Chinese Communist
expansionism.

Dated by:
FE:SPA:JDBell:geb 10/16/63

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

SPA - James D. Bell

Classification: FE - Cov. Harriman (in draft) White House - Mr. Komer (substance)

S/S - Mr. Rowe

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FROM: BANGKOK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1075, JANUARY 22, 6 PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1075, CINCPAC POLAD 279, DJAKARTA 41,
KUALA LUMPUR 57, LONDON 132, MANILA 123, SINGAPORE 56

FOLLOWING MY DISCUSSION TODAY WITH FONMIN THANAT ON THAI TROOPS
KOREA (EMBTEL 1072), I REFERRED TO HIS VISITS TO PHILIPPINES
AND MALAYA AND HIS MEETING YESTERDAY WITH PHILIPPINE VP
PELAEZ DURING LATTER'S HOUR LONG STOPOVER BANGKOK EN ROUTE TO
LONDON. I COMPLIMENTED THANAT ON HIS EFFORTS BRING ABOUT
PHILIPPINE-MALAY RECONCILIATION, REMARKING THAT IT APPEARED
PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE GETTING ASA WORKING AGAIN. THANAT
CONFIRMED TO ME HIS REMARKS TO PRESS YESTERDAY THAT AGREEMENT
HAD NOW BEEN REACHED TO HOLD ASA FOREIGN MINISTER MEETING SOON
IN MANILA, AND HE EXPECTED IT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN NEXT TWO OR
THREE MONTHS.

THANAT BELIEVED PELAEZ TRIP TO LONDON TO BE HELPFUL SINCE IT
HELPED RELIEVE DOMESTIC PRESSURE ON PHILIPPINE GOVT BY FOSTERING
IMPRESSION AMONG PHILIPPINE PUBLIC AND CONGRESS THAT GOVT WAS
DOING EVERYTHING IT COULD TO PURSUE PHILIPPINE CLAIMS IN NORTH
BORNEO. ANOTHER FAVORABLE FACTOR WAS TUNKU'S AGREEMENT TO
PURSUE TALKS ON PHILIPPINE CLAIMS AFTER FORMATION MALAYSIA
IF PHILIPPINE-BRITISH DISCUSSIONS WERE NOT FRUITFUL. INDONESIAN
POSITION HOWEVER HAS CAUSE GRAVE CONCERN.

THANAT EXPRESSED GREAT ANXIETY RE INDONESIAN ACTIONS, STATING
SOBERLY THAT HE BELIEVED INDONESIAN POLICIES WOULD BE MOST
SERIOUS PROBLEM IN AREA FOR NEXT SEVERAL YEARS. HE SUSPECTED
INDONESIAN DESIGNS WENT BEYOND OBSTRUCTING FORMATION MALAYSIA
AND EXTENDED TO ESTABLISHMENT INDONESIAN DOMINANCE OVER
ENTIRE AREA. INDONESIANS WERE ALREADY INTENSIFYING THEIR

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